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ABSTRACT

A Partial Equilibrium Analysis of North American Free Trade Agreement
and Its Impact on U .S. Beef Trade with Canada and Mexico

by

Srinidhi Ananthramiah, Doctor of Philosophy
Utah State University, 1996

Major Professor: Dr. Donald L. Snyder
Department: Economics

In September 1993, the United States Congress formally ratified the North
American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) in conj unction with the legislatures of
Canada and Mexico. NAFTA phases out tariff barriers between the United States,
Canada, and Mexico over a period of several years.
The primary purpose of this study is to provide an empirical tool for evaluating
the effects ofNAFTA on beef trade between Canada, Mexico, and the United States.
Trends were identified in U.S. beef exports and imports to Canada and Mexico over a
period of several years. From the data on import/export quantities and prices, relevant
elasticities were estimated for the the three trading partners using a partial adjustment
modeling technique.
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Given the elasticities, relevant statistical tests were performed to determine the
significance of price and quantity changes. This was done to determine whether changes
in trading practices were consistent.
Finally, policy recommendations were developed based on the assessment of
NAFTA on U.S . beef trade. An overall direction of trade among the three countries was
determined. Policies and implications based on economic theory were developed.
(68 pages)
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CHAPTER I
INTRODUCTION AND BACKGROUND

The study of international trade has been an integral and highly debated part of
economics for many years. Trying to keep pace with the changing international
environment has become a major concern for national economic policymakers. The
economies of numerous countries are closely linked through the international trade of
goods and services.
Basic trade statistics illustrate the importance of international trade to the U.S.
economy. From the 1960s through the 1980s, exports and imports both rose as a share
of GNP, more than doubling between 1965 and 1980 (International Monetary Fund).
However, between 1980 and 1987, exports plunged relative to GNP, while imports
remained relatively constant. As recently as 1988, another export boom occurred. Since
the 1980s and continuing into the 1990s, the implications of international trade have
been widely discussed relative to domestic economic policy. The long-term trend for
the U.S. appears to be towards increasing trade with other countries.
There is a strong economic rationale for trade, namely an increase in total output
benefiting all trading partners. Trade economists such as Caves, Frankel, and Jones;
Krugman and Obstfeld; Ethier, etc., argue that international trade is beneficial in that
there are overall gains from trade. The argument is that when countries sell goods and
services to one another, they do so for mutual gain. Trade provides benefits by allowing
countries to export goods produced from resources that are locally abundant while
importing goods produced from resources that are locally scarce.

2
Two important economic concepts related to trade are (I) comparative
advantage and (2) absolute advantage. The law of comparative advantage suggests that
a country's trade pattern will be determined by how efficiently it produces goods and
services relative to other nations. The law of absolute advantage refers to a country's
ability to produce a unit of output with fewer physical units of input. While the concept
of absolute advantage is of some theoretical interest, it is generally rendered impractical
because of resource constraints. Even though a country may be able to produce many
goods with fewer physical units of input, it often cannot do so because it generally faces
a limited supply of those inputs. Nations have different advantages because of varying
resource deposits and associated opportunity costs. In studying trade among nations,
the concept of comparative advantage is more relevant than that of absolute advantage.
Trade permits countries to specialize through the principle of comparative
advantage and to produce a narrower range of goods, with all participants being made
better off. International trade can also result in the creation of an integrated market that
is larger than any one country's market, which makes it possible for all market
participants to consume a greater variety of products.
The issue of trade barriers is closely tied to that oftrade. Trade barriers are
policies or practices enforced by governments that result in an inhibition of free trade of
goods and services among nations. The most common example of a trade barrier would
be the imposition of a tariff, or a tax, on imported goods. Examples ofnontariffbarriers
include quotas and environmental or health regulations . Governments often claim to be
worried about the effect international competition has on the performance of certain
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domestic industries and have tried to shield these industries from foreign competition by
either imposing tariffs (taxes) or placing quotas on imports. Sometimes the claim is
made that tariffs or quotas are placed on goods or services deemed to be critical to
national interest. To elicit political support from its citizens, a government might even
impose tariffs under the pretext of protecting the national interest from foreign intrusion.
When couched in these terms, it has to be viewed strictly as a political move. Krugman
and Obstfeld even suggest that one of the primary reasons for imposing a tariff is to
collect revenue for the government. Regardless of the justification, tariffs restrict the
free flow of goods and services and reduce aggregate production or output, thereby
reducing overall welfare.

Statement of the Problem
In September 1990, the United States and Mexico opened negotiations to
establish a free trade zone in North America. They were joined subsequently by Canada,
and negotiations led to the establishment of the North American Free Trade Agreement
(:"AFTA) in June of 1991 (Rempke, Spiller, and Petersen). In November 1993, the
United States Congress formally ratified this agreement, as did the legislatures of Mexico
and Canada (Rempke, Spiller, and Petersen). NAFTA became effective in January 1994.
NAFTA essentially phases out tariff and most nontariffbarriers over a period of
several years. The agreement liberalizes trade and investment policies. Over a period of
15 years, NAFTA is designed to establish free trade in agricultural products between the
United States and Mexico and opens new investment opportunities in key Mexican
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industries. Finally, it calls for the elimination of all tariffs and quotas of regional trade in
textiles, a heavily protected sector in each ofthe participating countries.
Despite the numerous attractions ofNAFTA, there has been considerable
political debate over its acceptance. The main criticism by special interest groups centers
on labor and environmental issues. Will NAFTA create more jobs than those lost as the
mix of goods and services change? What will be the impact of negative externalities
such as pollution? These, and numerous other issues, have been and continue to be
debated within Mexico, Canada, and the United States.

Study Objectives and Procedures
The primary purpose of this study is to provide an empirical basis for evaluating
the effects ofNAFTA on the beef trade between Canada, Mexico, and the United States.
The specific objectives of this study are to:
1.

2.

Identify the trends in U. S. beef exports and imports for Mexico and Canada.
a.

Collect pre-N AFTA data on beef import/export quantities and prices.

b.

Collect post-NAFTA data on beef import/export quantities and prices.

Determine the relevant elasticities for the beef trade among the U.S., Canada, and
Mexico.
a.

Use a partial adjustment modeling technique to estimate import/export
demand elasticities for U.S ., Canada, and Mexico.

b.

Compare and contrast pre- and post-NAFTA elasticities for the three
countries by testing the following hypothesis:
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Given the elasticities, determine whether changes in trading practices are
consistent and estimate the resulting changes in imports and exports following
the implementation ofNAFT A.
a.

Perform relevant statistical tests on pre- and post-NAFT A data to
determine the significance of price and quantity changes.

b.
4.

Project changes in imports and exports attributable to NAFTA.

Develop policy recommendations based on the assessment ofNAFTA on U.S.
beef trade.
a.

Use the results from objective (3) to determine the overall direction of
trade among the three countries.

b.

Recommend policies and implications based on these results.
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CHAPTER II
THEORY AND METHODOLOGY

In today's world, international trade is taking place but generally under accords
whereby countries accord differential treatment to their trading partners. This treatment
occurs by way of economic integration, where countries join together to create a larger
economic unit among the members. When countries form economic coalitions, they
move towards free trade among the partners. Each participating country attempts to
obtain some of the benefits of a more open economy without sacrificing control over the
goods and services that cross its borders and over its production and consumption
structure. Actions taken to integrate economies often take place in stages. There are
four basic types of formal regional economic arrangements.
The most common type of economic integration is known as a free trade area
(FTA) . Under this type of integration, members of the group remove tariffs on each
other's products while each member keeps its independence in establishing trading
policies with nonmembers. The members of a FTA can maintain individual tariffs and
other trade barriers for the rest of the world. When each participating country in a FTA
sets its own external tariff, nonmember countries might find it profitable to export a
product to the member country with the lowest level of outside barriers, then through it
to other members whose trade barriers might be higher. There are typically no rules of
origin regarding the source country of a product. Hence, nonmembers could use this
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transshipment strategy to escape some of the trade restrictions in the more highly
protected member countries.
Another example of economic integration is known as a customs union (CU). In
this level of integration, all tariffs are removed among members, and the group adopts a
common external commercial policy toward nonmembers. The group behaves as one
body in the negotiation of all trade agreements with nonmembers. The presence of a
common external tariff takes away the possibility of transshipment by nonmembers. This
is a closer step towards economic integration than that associated with a free trade area.
The third type of economic integration is known as a common market (CM). In
this case, all tariffs are removed among members and a common external policy is
adopted towards nonmembers. In addition, all barriers to factor movements among the
member countries are removed. This free movement of labor and capital among
members represents a higher level of national integration. The best example of this type
of economic integration has been the European Common (EC) Market.
The most comprehensive form of economic integration is the formation of an
economic union. It includes all the characteristics of a common market but also has the
unification of economic institutions and the coordination of economic policy throughout
all member countries. While they are independent political units, an economic union
establishes supranational institutions whose decisions are binding upon all members.
When such a union adopts a common currency, it becomes a monetary union. While this
type of union has been aspired to by several European nations, member countries find it
politically difficult to give up domestic sovereignty.
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Economic integration has differential treatment for member countries as opposed
to nonmember countries. This leads to shifts in the pattern of trade between members
and nonmembers. Therefore, there are both static and dynamic effects of economic
integration. While there is movement to free trade on the part of member countries,
economic integration can lead to the diversion of trade from a lower cost nonmember
source to a member source. The two static effects of economic integration are called
trade creation and trade diversion. Viner defined trade creation as taking place
whenever economic integration leads to a shift in production origin from a domestic
production whose resource costs are higher to a member producer whose resource costs
are lower. Presumably, this type of movement towards a free trade allocation of
resources is beneficiaL Trade diversion occurs whenever there is a shift in product origin
from a nonmember producer to a member producer whose resource costs are higher.
This type of shift could reduce welfare. The static effects of economic integration are
also referred to as the short-run effects or the partial equilibrium effects since they
encompass a time period occurring directly on the formation of an economic integration.
The static effects of an economic integration can be observed graphically. In
figure 1, D A is the demand curve by country A's consumers for the good, and

SA

is the

supply curve of country A's home producers.
Before economic integration, assume that the price of good in country A is $1.50
(which equals the $1.00 price in country B plus the 50% tariff). With integration
between A and B , the tariff is removed . Country A now imports 150 units (250 units100 units) rather than 40 units (200- 160) from country B, where 60 units (160- 100)
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Figure 1. Trade creation and welfare

of the increased imports displace home production and 50 units (250- 200) reflect the
greater consumption facing country A 's consumers at the new $1 .00 price. The net
welfare impact is the sum of areas band d, or (Yl)(60)($.50) + (Yl)(50)($.50)

=

$27.50.

The assumption is that country A is importing the good from country B , as well
as producing it domestically prior to the creation of the economic integration. If country

A is the pricetaker in the world market at $1 .00 per unit from country B and there is a
50% tariff on the traded goods, the domestic price inA is $1.50. The quantity consumed
is 200 units, and the quantity supplied domestically is 160 units. The quantity imported
by A from B is 40 units. When the tariff is removed on country B 's goods, the price of
the good in A falls to $1. 00. The quantity consumed in country A rises to 50 units
(250- 200).

I.
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In this trade creation, 60 units (160 - 100) have been shifted from domestic
production in country A to lower cost production in country B. Consumers also gain
from a larger quantity consumed. In this case, the welfare impact on country A is
positive. Consumers have received the additional surplus of areas "a+b +c+d." Area a
is a transfer of producer surplus from country A's suppliers while cis a transfer of tariff
revenue that now accrues to A 's consumers. The net welfare gain for country A consists
of areas "a+d." In this example, b = (\1,)(60 units)($0.50 per unit) = $15.00, and

d = (\1,)(50 units)($0.50 per unit) = $12.50. Country A has increased its welfare by
$15 .00 + $12 50 = $27.50.
It is possible to have a trade diversion that results in a loss as a consequence of
economic integration. Figure 2 shows the static effects of a trade diversion. Before
integration with country B, country A has a 50% tariff on imports of the traded good.

Country C's tariff-inclusive price in A's market is $1.50, and country B's tariff-inclusive
price is $1.80. Before integration, A imports 50 units (180- 130) from C. When union
is formed with B, country A imports 100 units (200 - l 00), all coming from partner B,
which no longer faces the tariff.
Suppose there are three countries, A, B, and C. Let A represent the home
country. B is the potential integration partner and C is the nonmember country. The
production cost inC is $1.00, while B has a cost of$1.20. The product price in A is
$1.50 because A has a 50% tariff in effect. Before any economic integration, country A
will buy from country C since C 's price with the tariff is lower than the tariff inclusive
price of B , which is $1.20 +50%= $1.80. Assume that country A forms an economic

II
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Figure 2. Trade diversion and welfare

union with country B and drops its protection against while maintaining its protection
against C. Country A now purchases the product for $1.20 from country B . Country C
has a tariff inclusive price of$1.50. C is still the low-cost supplier in real terms of
resource costs, but it is not competitive in A's market because of A's preferential
treatment of B . The impact in country A is to reduce the domestic price from $1.50 to
$1 .20, a decrease that produces a welfare gain equal to the triangles b and d. The net
welfare change for A is the difference between areas b and d (positive effect due to lower
price in A) and area e (negative effect due to lost tariff revenue by A that is not captured
by A's co nsumers) . Welfare is reduced since b + d = (Yz)(30)($.30) + (Yz)(20)($.30) =
$4 50 + $3 00 = $7 50, while e = (50)($.20) = $10.00.
The welfare gain captured by the sum of the areas of b and dis not the total
welfare effect. The tariff revenue that was previously collected was equal to the
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difference between the low cost supply price in country C ($1 .00) and the previous
domestic price ($1.50) for each unit imported. The value of this revenue equals the
areas of rectangles c and e. Rectangle c reflects the part of government revenue given
up after integration. This is transferred to domestic prices through the reduction in its
price. Rectangle e represents the difference in cost between the nonmember source and
the new higher cost member source. It reflects the cost of moving to the less efficient
producer in terms oflost government revenue. The net effect of economic integration
between A and B depends on the sum " b+d+e" There is no guarantee that " b+d'' will
be larger than area e.

In this example, area e represents the difference in cost per unit between country
Band country C ($1.20- $1.00 = $0.20) times the amount of trade diverted, the original
50 units (180- 130) The trade diversion equals ($0 .20)(50) = $10.00 Areas band d
reflect the consumer surplus gain that is not a transfer from domestic producers and the
government. Area b represents the improved efficiency effect since 30 units of the good
(130- I 00) are now produced at a lower cost in country B. This effect has a value of
('/,)(30)($0.30) = $4.50. Area d reflects the remaining consumer surplus gain from the
lower price to A's consumers. This equals (\1,)(200- 180 = 20)($0.30) = $3 .00. The net
effect of integration between countries A and Bin this situation is a loss of$2.50
($10 .00- $4.50- $3 .00). If economic integration involves trade diversion, it is possible
that welfare can be reduced for the home country.

In a trade diversion context, the more closely the price in the partner country
approaches the low cost world price, the more likely the impact of integration on the
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market in question will be positive. The impact of trade diversion is also more likely to
be positive the higher the initial rate of tariff since areas b and d will be larger. The more
elastic the supply and demand curves, the more likely the static effects might be positive
because the more elastic the curves, the greater the quantity response by producers and
consumers. This would make areas of b and d greater as well. Economic integration
might be more beneficial when there are a greater number of participating countries in
the union . This is because there will be a smaller group of countries from which trade
can be diverted .
Along with the static or partial equilibrium effects of economic integration, there
are also dynamic effects of economic integration. In this scenario, the economic
structure and performance of participating countries may evolve differently than if they
had not integrated. Reducing trade barriers brings about a competitive environment and
possibly reduces the degree of monopoly power present prior to integration. Access to
larger markets may result in economies of scale to be realized in certain export goods.
These economies of scale may result internally to an exporting firm as it becomes larger
in size or may be brought about from a lowering of costs due to economic integration.
In both situations, they are triggered by market expansion brought about by membership
in the trade association.
Gains in welfare occur when trade creation removes protected production and
increases the physical trade among members. Losses in welfare occur when a
preferential trade agreement causes a country to switch purchases from a more efficient
to a less efficient supplier.
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A preferential trading agreement tends to shift the terms of trade of each party.
The members of such a union maximize their joint welfare by freeing trade among
themselves and imposing an optimal tariff against outsiders. An optimal tariff minimizes
the loss in welfare to the imposing nation . A member can lose if it gives preferential
treatment to a partner while at the same time, its terms of trade with the outside world
fail to improve. Ifthere is an improvement, member and partner may both benefit.
NAFTA is based on the theory of preferential trading agreements.
According to Krugman and Obstfeld, NAFTA can follow the example of the
European Economic Community, perhaps the best modem example of a trading bloc.
The EEC has created a good deal of free trade and increased the welfare of its members.
To test what impact NAFTA might have on U.S. beef trade, the development of a
sophisticated estimation model is required . One methodology suggested in a study on
the export demand for U.S . cotton is that of distributed lag models (Duffy, Richardson,
and Wohlgenant).

Distributed Lag Model (Partial Atljustment
Model)
According to Kmenta, one of the most popular forms of a distributed lag model
is a geometric lag model known as the partial adjustment or habit persistence model. It
is based on the reasoning that in a regression model, the expected value of a dependent
variable, E(YJ, is a function of an explanatory variable Y; at time t-1 , or Y1_1. An
example of this might be a simple relationship where the desired level of consumption
may be a linear function of wealth. A formation of such expectations is based on the
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idea that current expectations can be derived by modifYing previous expectations. The
values of Y; are not observed directly, but the assumption is made that the actual level
ofY will reach the desired level ofY, but not necessarily in one period. Hence, there is
only a partial adjustment in any one period. There may be various reasons why a
complete adjustment ofY to Y'is not achieved in one period, including the persistence of
habits, technological constraints, institutional rigidities, etc. The major task in relation to
the partial adjustment model is to determine if there exists an adjustment mechanism
process whereby economic agents (i .e., consumers or producers) use past experiences to
determine future behavior. Partial adjustment or habit persistence models are distributed
lag models that assume current expectations of quantities and prices are influenced by
previous expectations. The economic rationale for a partial adjustment model is the
assumption that there exists an adjustment mechanism process whereby economic
agents use past experience to determine future behavior.
With respect to the current study, there will be an adjustment time and process
that take place in order for the desired level of activity to be realized following the
implementation of trade policy. This adjustment time is often modeled using a
distributed lag (partial adjustment) mathematical model, one that is common to export
and import quantities.
Suppose that the desired level of a good at time period t is given by a function of
some explanatory variable x; as

Y', = a + PX.

(I)
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The relationship between the actual and the desired level of Y may be specified by the
following :
(2)
where 0

~

y < 1. The coefficient ( 1-y) is the adjustment coefficient since it shows the

adjustment from Y to Y' . This coefficient allows us to determine the number of periods
required to close a proportion p of the gap between Y* 1 and Y,. After one period, (1-y)
is closed so that y of the gap still remains. After two periods, the amount of the closure
is (1 -y) + y (1-y) = 1-y 2 , with y 2 remaining. After n periods, the proportions of the gap
that is closed can be represented as
1- y" = p

(3)

The required number of periods to close the gap is

n • log (1 - p)
logy

(4)

Solving equation (2) for Y, and substituting into equation (1) gives

Y, = a(l-y) + P(l -y) X, + yY1_1 + E 1.

(. )

Equation (3) describes a geometric lag form of
(6)

Consider the problem of estimating the parameters of a geometrically distributed
lag model, i.e., y, =a+

Po(X, + A - X, . 1 + .A. 2 X,_ 2 + . .) + E, , where E1 is a random

normal variable with mean zero and variance and that the disturbances are normally
distributed and E( E1E,)

=

0 (where t

~

s). However, the distributed lag model is not
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appropriate for estimation in its original form because it has an infinite number of
regressors. By applying the Koyck transformation, it can be written

Y1 = a+

p (1-y)X, + A(Y1_1 ) + e,-

AE 1_1

(7)

or

Y, = a 0 +

p0 X1 +A Y,_ 1 + 'llt

(8)

where a 0 = a(l-A), Po = P(l-A), and 'llt = E1 - AE 1_1 . The trouble with the disturbance
term is that it is correlated with Y1_1, which is an explanatory variable, in the following
manner :

(9)
Using ordinary least squares estimation for this type of model would yield inconsistent
results.
Consistent estimates of the coefficients under the assumption specified in
Equation (9) can be obtained in various ways. Kmenta has suggested the method of
instrumental variables. In this study's estimation of the import demand equations for the
U.S ., Canada, and Mexico, there are two relevant explanatory variables. They are the
price ratios and the lagged values of the quantities of beef imported. Two instrumental
variables with respect to the two explanatory variables could be used, say Z 1 and Z 2 .
They should satisfY the following conditions:

I.

plim •

E, (Zit-

z,)~/·

. 0 and plim E, cz, - Z2)~/·

2.
with both being finite numbers different from zero .

- 0

(10)
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To illustrate this type of model used in this study, it is assumed that there is an
equilibrium, or long-run, or desired amount of imported beef Assume that this quantity
ofthe good at time period tis a linear function of the explanatory variable,

Y,· = P0 + P1X1 + f1 1 ,

(11)

where Y,• is the quantity of beef,~ is the relative priced of beef, f1 1 is the disturbance
term with the following specifications:

f!, - N(O,o 2)

(normal distribution with zero mean and constant
variance)
(zero mean)

E(f!J = 0

Cov (f!, f!;) = 0 for i"j (nonautocorrelated)
Var (f!J

=

o2

(homoscedastic)

Since the desired level of output is not directly observable, Nerlove (Kmenta

1986) postulated the following partial adjustment hypothesis:
Y, - Y,_ 1 = y(Y,• - Y,_1)

(12)

where 0 < y < I . y is known as the partial adjustment coefficient and where Y, - Y,_1 is
the actual change and (Y,·- YJ is the desired change.
Equation (12) postulates that the actual change in commodity stock in any given
time period t is some fraction of the desired change for that period. If y = 1, the actual
change in demand is equal to the desired change in demand. This means that the actual
adjusts to the desired level in the same time period. If y

=

0, that means nothing changes

since the actual quantity at time t is the same as that observed in the previous time
period. y is expected to lie between two extrtemes, 0 and 1, because the adjustment to
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the desired level is incomplete because of such factors as contractual obligations. The
adjustment mechanism in equation (12) can also be expressed as
(13)
showing that the observed demand at time I is a weighted average of the desired demand
at that time and the quantity demanded in the previous time period, t-1, with y and ( 1-y)
being weights. Substitution of(l2) into (13) yields
Yt = (P 0 + P 1X 1 +

I!J and (1-y)Yt-l

= Po+ P1X1 + (1-y)Yt-1 + lit
(14)

Yt = a 0 + a 1X 1 + a 2Yt-l + vt

where a 0 = yp 0, a 1 = YPt> a 2 = (I- y), and vt = Yilt . Equation (14) is to be estimated.
To determine the method of estimation, we need to examine the properties of v" the
disturbance term where vt = Yilt and lit -N(O, a 2 ) .
E(v.) = E(yi!J = yE(I!J = 0

(zero mean)

(15)

Cov(vi vi) = E[yi- E(yi)] (yi- E(yj)] = E[vi,vi] = E[YI!i.I!Yj]
= y 2 E(lli• l!j) = 0 fori ~i

(nonautocorrelated)

(16)

Var (yi) = E[v i - E(v)f = E(vi
= E(Yili = y 2 E(lli = y 2 cr 2

(homoscedastic)

(17)

The above analysis shows that v i is also white noise like lit· The OLS method can
therefore be used for estimation of parameters.
Because (12) represents the long-run demand for beef imports, (14) can be called
the short-run demand function . In the short-run, the existing demand for beef may not
be equal to its long-run level. Once the short-run function is estimated, we obtain the
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estimate of the adjustment coefficient y . Then, the long-run elasticity of demand can be
drieved in the following manner:

r,· . -"-'-.
I - a3

vP1

vP1

- (I - y)

P1 refers to the long-run elasticity of demand .

y

(18)

p1

IfY1* and X, are logarithms of the

quantity demanded and the prices, respectively,

p1 indicated the long-run elasticitiy of

demand after all adjustments take place in response to a change in X, , which is the
relative price of beef
The partial adjustment model can be shown diagramatically, as in figure 3. In this
figure, Y; is the desired level of imported beef and Y 1 is the current actual level. To
illustrate this point, assume that y = .5, implying that the importing nation plans to close
one halfofthe gap between the actual level of imported beef and the desired level. In
the first period, it moves to Y2 , with imports equal to (Y2 - Y 1) , which is half of

(¥* - Y 1) .

In each subsequent period, it closes half the gap between the imported beef at

the beginning of the period and the desired level

¥*.

To estimate the parameters in equation ( 14), we use the least squares method.
Note that the long-run coefficient

p1 is not unbiased because "unbiasedness does not

carry over" via nonlinear functions (Kmenta, p. 486). Although the small sample
properties are not met, the desirable asymptotic properties hold. The determination of
the variance of Ji 1 is somewhat more complicated. We will use the Kmenta

.

approximation, which is obtained by using Taylor expansion. In this case, p 1

al

• -- .

1 - &3
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Beef Imports

y.

y,

,---

y,

f--

Time

Figure 3. The gradual adjustment of the beef imports to price changes
To estimate the variance of p1 , we use the following formula:

v... cil,>.

1-] v... em,> • [-m'-]v... c«,> . 2[-1 -r~Jcovc«,. «,>
[1-m
(I - m3
(I m3) (l -m3) 2
3

(t9)

The above formula can be used to determine the large sample variance of P1. Note that
the variances of & 2 and

&3

are estimated in the usual manner. The parameters of

equation (14) are computed by using OLS.

Predictive Chow Test
The predictive Chow test is used for time series data to see if additional
obervations come from the same population as the first n observations. In this study,
two sets of regressions were made to determine pre- and post-NAFT A elasticities of
import prices and past imports. The null hypothesis we are testing is that the estimated
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parameters are the same for the two sets against the alternative hypothesis that they are
different. The predictive Chow test statistic takes the form
(20)

where SSER is the restricted sum of the squares of least squares residuals (which
includes the residuals of the post-NAFTA regressions), SSE 1 is the sum of of the squares
of least squares of the original set of observations (which includes the regressions of the
pre-NAFTA observations), m is the additional number of observations (which would be
I since there is only one additional observation for import prices and quantity of
imports), n is the original number of observations in the time series, and K is the number
of parameters that have been estimated. There are 28 original observations and four
parameters including the intercept in the regression.
The focus of this study on NAFTA and its impact ofU.S . beef trade with Canada
and Mexico will involve the static or partial equilibrium analysis of the free trade
agreement. This is because the analysis is directed towards the immediate impact on the
trading patterns upon the implementation of this particular economic union. The
long-term impact ofNAFTA on the beef trade among the three countries can take place
over a number of years. With sufficient variables and data corresponding to these
variables, a general equilibrium model can be constructed to determine the long-term
implications ofNAFTA' s effects. However, this study is primarily interested in the
short-term effects.
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CHAPTER III
LITERATURE REVIEW

The literature available on the effects ofNAFTA is quite broad. Hence, only the
most relevant studies will be referenced here. A review of relevant literature on U.S .
agricultural trade and distributed lag models is also given.

NAFTA Literature

Segarra made a qualitative assessment of the effects ofNAFTA on trade in
livestock products between the U.S . and Mexico. He concluded that the U.S . had a
competitive advantage in the production of livestock products because of! ower feed
grain costs and better infrastructure. According to his research, the U.S . livestock
products most likely to experience increased exports include high quality beef and pork.
He further concluded that increases in the export of Mexican livestock products to the
U.S. are unlikely to occur. The exports oflive cattle to the U.S . will remain high in the
short run, but not necessarily so in the long run .
Barkema conducted a descriptive analysis of the impact ofNAFTA on U.S .
agriculture by using secondary data from the USDA. He concluded that an expanded
Mexican economy would result in an increase in the demand for foodstuffs . The major
beneficiaries in the U.S . will be the feed grains and soybean sectors, but the U.S .
livestock sector was also shown to benefit slightly.
Burfisher, Robinson, and Thierfelder analyzed the economic effects ofNAFTA
on the agriculture of the U.S. and Mexico using a 28-sector and two-country computable
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general equilibrium (CGE) model. The focus of the model was on raw and processed
agricultural products. They concluded that the total agricultural exports from the U.S .
to Mexico would increase, as would U.S . imports. However, imports did not increase as
much as exports, thus improving the U.S . trade balance with Mexico. The real GDP of
both nations tended to rise as a result of trade liberalization.
Hinojosa-Ojeda, Robinson, and Moulton analyzed the potential economic effects
of the removal of trade barriers between the U.S . and Mexico using a three-country and
seven-sector CGE model. They discovered that the lowering of trade barriers by itself
had a minor impact on the U.S . economy. The impact on the Mexican economy was
greater. The authors suggested that these results were to be expected since the existing
trade barriers between the U.S . and Mexico were relatively small, and one would not
expect large aggregate economic effects by removing them.
Krisoff, Neff, and Sharples focused specifically on the effects of trade
liberalization on the agricultural subsectors of grain, livestock, and horticulture using a
static, partial equilibrium model. Their results showed that the U.S . agricultural exports
would increase, with grain and oil seeds accounting for most of this expansion.
Horticultural products would account for over half of Mexico's expansion of exports to
the U.S ., and there would be an increase in Mexican exports offeeder cattle. Total U.S .
beef exports would also increase but only slightly in comparison to grain and oilseeds.

In a report commissioned by the Congressional Budget Office (CBO), an
overview of Mexico's agriculture and the recent history of agricultural trade among the
U.S . and Mexico was presented. The CBO paper was a descriptive analysis that
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assessed the effects of the free trade agreement on three different agricultural sectors:
( l) grains and oilseeds, (2) animal and animal products, and (3) fruits and vegetables.
The study concluded that under NAFTA, U.S . exports of grains and oil seeds to Mexico
would grow. U.S. exports of dairy products would increase and U.S. beef producers
would also benefit from this agreement because of the competitive advantage the U.S .
has in the Mexican market relative to other nations.
In a descriptive study of the Mexican dairy industry and the impacts ofNAFT A,
Hallberg provided an economic analysis of the institutional structure of the Mexican
dairy industry. They concluded that there would be an expanded demand for U.S.
exports of dairy animals and related equipment. The primary U.S. export opportunities
for dairy products would be in nonfat dry milk and butter oil. Mexican demand for
higher quality manufactured dairy products would probably benefit milk producers in
South Texas.
In a paper presented at the Brookings Institution, Josling examined the welfare
effects ofNAFT A from agricultural trade. He observed that the main effects would be
concentrated in grains, particularly corn, and in fruit and vegetable production in
northern Mexico. Environmental regulations would have an important effect on the
quantitative magnitude of the trade between the U.S . and Mexico. Overall, there would
be a net welfare gain to both the United States and Mexico but the distribution of these
gains would differ. According to Josling, U.S . grain producers would gain from higher
exports, but consumers would face higher prices. In Mexico, producers would lose and
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consumers would gain_ He concluded that agriculture was a case where the net gains to
the US . would exceed those to Mexico.
Brown, Deardorff, and Stern used a five-country, 29-sector CGE model to
analyze changes in employment that would be required across sectors in the US.
economy as a result ofNAFTA Their results revealed that the US . would experience
economic welfare gains, along with an increase in its overall wage rate. With respect to
agriculture, US . agricultural output and employment would both increase. The authors
concluded that under NAFTA, there would appear to be very little displacement of US .
workers.
In a similar study presented for the Brookings Institution, Hinojosa-Ojeda and
Rob inson examined the potential effects ofNAFTA on wages and employment in
Mexico and the US . The authors used a two-country, 29-sector CGE model to capture
the effects of shifts in the sectoral structure of trade, output, and employment
According to the authors, the removal of restrictions on trade in agricultural products
would induce a large migration of workers within Mexico from rural to urban areas.
Subsequently, there might be a rise in migration to the US. In the US., they observed
an increase in the wage rate of all workers, skilled and unskilled. However,
Hinojosa-Ojeda and Robinson concluded with a note of caution. Although CGE models
are quite effective in describing the long-term direction of change, adjustment costs were
thought to be seriously understated. They suggested that policymakers should consider
actions to facilitate adjustment and to provide compensation for those workers who
would be displaced.
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U.S. Trade
Morey et al. examined the effects ofU.S. and foreign agricultural policies on
trade, utilizing a macroeconomic analysis ofU.S . farm policy. They concluded that the
trade effects of such policies depended on the demand for U.S. products in world
agricultural markets. The authors also examined the relationship between agriculture
and trade in both developed and developing economies. They looked at protectionist
measures for producers and consumers in exporting and importing countries. Finally,
the authors examined the linkages and influences of the rest of the economy on U.S .
agriculture. They concluded that macroeconomic factors such as interest rates, inflation,
and the value of the U.S. dollar affected the price ofU.S. farm products overseas and the
ability of other nations to pay for U.S . farm exports.
In a study commissioned by the World Food Institute, Wang and Wisner
examined the U.S. share of global agricultural trade. They projected a steady growth
rate for U .S. agricultural exports through 1996 based on past trends, particularly for beef
and poultry products. The authors argued for more liberal trade policies as proposed by
the GATT negotiations. They concluded that with the continuing advances in
biotechnology leading to efficiency in livestock feeding, U.S . agricultural exports would
continue to contribute to the improved health of U .S. agriculture.
In a statistical report of the U.S . Department of Agriculture, current and
historical data on U .S. foreign trade in agricultural products were summarized. The
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study highlighted commodity and country information, including dollar values, quantities,
principal markets for agricultural exports, and import sources.
Southard analyzed the trends and outlook for trade in U.S . livestock and poultry.
His study paralleled the study of Wang and Wisner. He also projected a steady growth
rate for U.S agricultural products, particularly beef and poultry.
In a similar study by Dwyer, Carter, and Greene, the authors concentrated on the
outlook for U. S. agricultural exports. They estimated that the total value of agricultural
exports in 1994 would remain relatively unchanged from 1993 . They forecasted that the
commodities with the largest gains in terms of exports would be livestock, poultry, and
dairy products. Beef, pork, and variety meats were expected to account for most of the
gain as exports to the two neighboring nations, Canada and Mexico, continue to rise.
The authors concluded that greater foreign demand for U.S. meats will be a continuing
trend for the next two years because of rising foreign incomes, the apparent reduction in
trade barriers, and a desire of consumers to add more protein to their diets in the form of
meats.
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CHAPTER IV
THE MODEL

The model utilized in the current analysis is based on the following theoretical
form :
In (Msij d) = a 'In (bij) - a' In (Pij!PJ

(20)

where Msij d is the desired quantity of imports from country j into country I, and a' is the
long-run elasticity of import demand. The relationship between the actual and desired
quantity of imports is expressed as
(21)

lnMsij'(t) -In Msij (t-1) = y{ln Ms/ (t) -In Msij (t-1)}
where the coefficient y is the adjustment coefficient, and t indicates the time period.
Substituting (20) into (21) and rearranging leads to
In Msij (t) = y a' In (bij) - y a' In Pij (Pc) + (1-y )In Msij (t-1)

(22)

w here ya ' = a is the short-run elasticity of import demand. To account for possible
changes over time that are unrelated to relative prices, a trend can also be included in the
estimates. In this study, it is assumed that the intercept, bij• is a function of time (T), so
that
bij = ~jTi/

(23)

Substituting (22) into (23) leads to the following functional form to be estimated.
In Msij (t)

=

ya 'tn (~li/)- ya 'in (Pi/P0 + (1-a) In Msij (t-1)

(24)

This equation was used as the import demand equation for the three countries
included in this study. Time-series data for the years 1966-1993 were used in the
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estimation of import demand equations. The data were log-linearized prior to the
regression to facilitate the calculation of the respective elasticities. The logs of the actual
quantity of beef imports were regressed on the logs of the actual beef imports of the
three countries. Following Nerlove's partial adjustment framework, import demand
equations for beef can be estimated.

Data

Trade data for U.S. beef exports/imports to Canada and Mexico were collected
from the U.S Department of Commerce (1994) through its Bureau of Census Report .
The data for the Canadian/Mexican beef trade were obtained through the Canadian
Ministry of Finance and the Mexican Department of Commerce. These trade data are
given in appendix tables 5 through I 0 (shown later). The data are expressed in millions
of pounds and the average price per pound is in U.S. dollars. The price indices for beef
in the three countries were obtained from the United Nations Food and Agricultural

Production (United Nations) and are provided in table II (shown later). The data cover
a period of 28 years, 1966-1 993 .

Results

Export and import beef demand equations were estimated for each of the three
countries under study, with the results summarized below. The estimated coefficients
are the parameter estimates, which can be interpreted as elasticities. The !-statistics are
shown in parentheses for each estimated parameter.

31
The results for each of the demand equations are summarized in table 1. In the
economic analysis of import demand for Canada, Mexico, and the U.S., it is necessary to
look at the estimated elasticities of import prices and past imports. In the past 30 years,
Canadian imports of U.S. beef have shown a positive trend as is evidenced by the
estimated trend coefficient of 0. 63. With respect to the Canadian beef imports from the
U.S., the coefficient sign was negative, which would be consistent with economic theory,
and the absolute value of the price elasticity coefficient was 0. 64. This implies that the
import price elasticity of beef from the U.S. is relatively inelastic. For a 1% increase in
the price of beef from the U.S., Canadian beef imports would be expected to decline by
0.64 million pounds. Past import levels also have a significant impact on current import
levels as shown by the estimated lagged import coefficient value of0.31 . This suggests

Table 1. Estimated Import Demand Function Coefficients, 1966-1993

Source
Country

Destination
Country

Constant

Trend

Price
Ratio

Lagged
Imports

Rz
F-Stat

U.S.

Canada

u.s.

Mexico

Canada

U.S.

Mexico

U.S

Mexico

Canada

Canada

Mexico

-2.50
(.603)
-4.65
(-9.28)
1.32
(0.97)
-16.11
(6.03)
-2.97
(-4.01)
-2.21
(-1.66)

0.63
(5.24)
0.54
(8.38)
0.29
(5.19)
1.20
(7.37)
0.09
(4.90)
0.59
(1.76)

-0.64
(-5.56)
-0.75
(-8.54)
-0.47
(-6.97)
-2.46
(-5.62)
-0.35
(-3.54)
-0.34
(-1.49)

0.31
(2.89)
0.24
(2.42)
0.35
(2.08)
0.45
(4.15)
0.29
(2.11)
0.15
(11.41)

.91
73.67
.89
61.35
.25
403
.88
56.40
.93
100.75
.98
715.01
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that 31% of current imports can be directly related to past import levels. The overall
explanatory power for this import demand function is relatively good with an R 2 of .91
and an F -statistic of 73.67.
In the past 30 years, Mexican imports ofU.S. beef have also shown a positive
trend, as shown by the estimated trend coefficient of0.54. The absolute value of the
price elasticity coefficient was 0.75 . This indicates that the import price elasticity of beef
is relatively inelastic. For a I% increase in the price of beef from the U.S. , Mexican beef
imports would be expected to decline by 0.75 million pounds. Past imports also have an
impact on current levels as evidenced by the estimated lagged import coefficient value of
0.24. This suggests that 24% of current imports can be directly related to past import
levels. The overall explanatory power of this import demand function is relatively good
with an R 2 of .89 and an F-statistic of 61.35.
For U.S . imports of Canadian beef in the past 30 years, the estimated trend
coefficient has been positive, as shown by an estimate of0.29. The absolute value of the
price elasticity coefficient was 0.47. This suggests that the import elasticity of beef from
Canada is relatively inelastic. For a 1% increase in the price of beef from Canada, U.S .
beef imports would be expected to decline by 0.4 7 million pounds. Past import levels
also have an impact on current import levels. The estimated lagged import coefficient
value was 0.35, which suggests 35% of current imports can be related to past import
levels. The overall explanatory power for this import demand function is relatively poor
with an R 2 of .25 and an F-statistic of 4.03 .
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With respect to U.S . imports ofMexican beef, the estimated trend coefficient has
been positive at 1.20. The absolute value of the price elasticity coefficient was 2.46.
This implies that import elasticity of beef from Mexico is relatively elastic. For a I%
increase in the price ofbeeffrom Mexico, U.S . beef imports would be expected to
decline by 2.46 million pounds. The estimated lagged import value was 0.45, which
suggests that 45% of current imports can be related to past import levels. The overall
explanatory power for this import demand function was relatively good with an R 2 of .88
and an F-statistic of 56.40.
With respect to U.S . imports of Mexican beef, the estimated trend coefficient has
been positive at 1.20. The absolute value of the price elasticity coefficient was 2.46.
This implies that the import elasticity of beef from Mexico is relatively elastic. For a I%
increase in the price of beef from Mexico, U.S. beef imports would be expected to
decline by 2.46 million pounds. The estimated lagged import value was 0.45, which
suggests that 45% of current imports can be related to past import levels. The overall
explanatory power for this import demand function was relatively good with an R 2 of .88
and an F-statistic of 56.40.
In the past 30 years, Canadian imports of Mexican beef have shown a slightly
positive trend at 0.09. The absolute value of the price elasticity coefficient was .35.
This suggests that import elasticity of beef from Mexico is relatively price inelastic. For
a 1% increase in the price of beef from Mexico, Canadian beef imports would be
expected to decline by .35 million pounds. The estimated lagged import value was 0.29,
suggesting that 29% of current beef imports can be related to past import levels. The
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overall explanatory power for this import demand function was relatively good with an
R 2 of .93 and an F-statistic of 100.75.
For Mexican imports of Canadian beef, the estimated trend coefficient was
positive at 0.59. The absolute value of the price elasticity coefficient was .34, suggesting
that the import elasticity of Canadian beef to Mexico is relatively inelastic. For a 1%
increase in the price of beef from Canada, Mexican beef imports would decline by .34
million pounds. The estimated lagged import value was 0.83, suggesting that 83% of
current beef imports can be related to past import levels. The overall explanatory power
for this import function was relatively good with an R 2 of .98 and an F-statistic of
715 .01.
The results of this analysis of the short-term implication ofNAFTA show that the
effects of removing trade barriers on beef has the greatest impact on Mexican beef
exports to the US The import demand elasticity of -2.46 suggests that given a price
decrease of 1%, the Mexican export of beef to the U.S. would increase by 2.46 million
pounds. The study that most closely resembles this result was done by Krisoff, Neff, and
Sharples. They also used a static, partial equilibrium model to study the effects of trade
liberalization on the agricultural sub sectors of grain, livestock, and horticulture. They
concluded that Mexican exports of beef would increase. U.S. beef exports would also
grow but only slightly in comparison to grain and oil seeds. In most of the studies done
on NAFTA's impact on U.S. agricultural trade, the U.S . appeared to be the main
beneficiary in increased beef exports after the liberalization of trade. The results of this
study also parallel the work of Hinojosa-Ojeda, Robinson, and Moulton, who analyzed

35

the potential economic effects ofthe removal of trade barriers between the U.S. and
Mexico. They concluded that the impact on the Mexican economy was larger.
Segarra's study showed that because the U.S. had a competitive advantage in the
production oflivestock products, the U.S. livestock products most likely to experience
increased exports included high-quality beef and pork. The U.S., Canada, and Mexico
are likely to experience increases in their beef trade between one another.
The U.S./Canada beef trade has shown an import price demand that has been
relatively inelastic. For Canadian beef imports from the U.S., the absolute value of the
price elasticity coefficient has been relatively inelastic. For Canadian beef imports from
the U.S., the absolute value of the price elasticity coefficient has been 0.64, while the
U.S. beef imports from Canada has been 0.47. The implication is that Canadian imports
ofU.S. beef are relatively more elastic than U.S. imports of Canadian beef Even though
the U.S. might have a comparative advantage in beef production to Canada, it is possible
that when the price of beef imported from the U.S. increases in Canada, Canadians could
substitute other meat products or domestically produced beef for American beef
products. With respect to U.S. beef imports from Canada, it is possible that Canadian
beef is going to certain regions of the U.S. where transportation and distribution costs
are cheaper relative to beef producing regions in the U.S. Hence, a percentage increase
in the price of Canadian beef would result in less than a 1% decrease in the imports of
beef from Canada. Assuming that this is true, this would be a possible explanation for the
lower import price elasticity facing the U.S. from Canada. When trade barriers are
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removed, U.S . beef exports would be expected to increase to Canada relative to
increases in Canadian beef exports to the U.S .
With respect to the U.S ./Mexico beef trade, the absolute value of the price
elasticity coefficient facing U.S. imports of Mexican beef has been relatively elastic at
2.46. This implies that Americans can readily substitute domestically produced beef and
other meat products if the price ofMexican beef in the U.S . increases. The higher
elasticity implies competition in the American beef market. For Mexican imports of U.S .
beef, the import demand elasticity has been relatively inelastic at 0.75 . The quality of
beef imported by Mexico from the U.S . might be higher than domestically produced
beef. The U.S. has a comparative advantage in beef production to Mexico. With the
removal of trade barriers, the results indicate that given a decrease in beef prices,
Mexican beef exports to the U.S . would increase relatively to an increase in U.S . beef
exports to Mexico.
With respect to the Canada/Mexico trade over the past 30 years, the magnitude
of the beef trade between the two countries has not been as significant in relation to the
beef trade these two countries have had with the U.S . The estimated price elasticity for
Canadian imports of Mexican beef has been -.35 while the Mexican imports of Canadian
beef has been .34. This implies that with the removal of trade barriers, neither of the two
countries would increase beef exports more than the other.
To test the significance of pre- and post-NAFTA prices and quantities, data on
beef trade for 1994 among the three countries were collected. This represented the
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post-NAFTA prices and quantities. Import demand equations were once again estimated
for the time period 1966-1994 (table 2).
The results of the post-NAFTA regressions look almost identical to the
pre-NAFTA estimates. To test if the parameters of the pre- and post-NAFTA estimates
are the same or significantly different, a statistical test known as the predictive Chow test
is performed.
Prior to performing the predictive Chow test, we need to look at the problem of
forecasting the value of the dependent variable, in this case, the quantity of beef imports,
for a given set of explanatory variables. Let the given values of the explanantory
variables be Jeo2 ,

Jeo3, ... , Xo~o

and let the corresponding value of the dependent variable

be Y0 . Forecasting Y0 is of interest here.

Table 2. Estimated Import Demand Function Coefficients, 1966-1994
Source
Country

Destination

U.S.

Canada

U.S.

Mexico

Canada

U .S.

Mexico

us

Mexico

Canada

Canada

Mexico

Country

Constant

-2.50
(.617)
-4.65
(-9.49)
1.32
(.97)
-16.16
(6.03)
-2.95
(-4.07)
-2.21
(-1.70)

Trend

0.63
(5.38)
0.54
(8.60)
0.29
(5.27)
1.23
(7.47)
0.09
(4.99)
(.59)
(1.76)

Price
Ratio

-0.64
(-5.69)
-0.75
(-8.77)
-0.47
(-7.09)
-2.47
(-5.74)
-0.33
(-3 .29)
-0.34
(-1.53)

Lagged
Imports

0.31
(2.95)
0.24
(2.53)
0.35
(2.10)
0.45
(4.30)
.30
(2.14)
0.16
(11.65)

R2
F-Stat

.91
87.39
.89
69.37
.25
4.21
.88
59.42
.93
103.80
.98
720.02
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The best predictor ofY0 is E(Y0) , because the variance ofY0 around E(Y0) is
smaller than around any other point. Since E(Y0) is not known, we use Y0, the least
squares fitted value ofY0, in its place. Since
f, -~ •. ~ ,X,. ~.x,

. ... -~,x..,

(25)

it follows that Y0 is normally distributed with mean

The variance of Y 0 is

for all j , k = 2,3, .. , K; j < k.
The forecast error is
mean

E(Y,- f,) -

Var ( Y 0 ) .

o1 ,

(Y, - f,).

This random variable is normally distributed with

oand variance

o!- Var (Y, - f,) • Var (Y,) • Var (Y,)- 2Cov (Y~f,) ,

o}, , and

- 2Cov(Y~f.>. -2E[Y0 - E(Y,)][Y0 - E(Y,)]--2E[Y0 - E ( Y,)].

Var(Y,).

where
o. Therefore,

The shorter the distance between the given values of the explanatory variables
and their respective sample means the smaller the variance of the forecast error. An
unbiased estimator of o 2F can be obtained by replacing o 2 by s2 If we denote the
resulting estimator by s2 f, then

Y_- Y

-Sp-0 -'·-x·

(28)

From this result, we can construct a forecast interval that will contain the actual value of
Y0 with whatever probablity we choose. Designating one minus the chosen probability
level by (O<a< l), we have
(29)
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In this study, we have estimated regression equations for the import demand for
beef among Canada, Mexico, and the United States. Six regression equations were
estimated. The sample consisted of 28 observations covering the period 1966-1993.
Since NAFTA became effective in 1994, six regression equations were estimated for the
period covering 1966-1994. The observed variables were the quantity ofbeefimports,
the prices of these imports, and the lagged values of the quantity of beef imports.
Table 3 summarizes the observed values and the forecasted values for the log of beef
imports covering the period 1966-1994.
The estimated regression equation for Canadian beef imports from the United
States is
MIJC1; = -2.50 + .629TIJ1; - .64PRC1; + .31MIJCL;,

(30)

where MIJC 1 is the log of the imported quantity of beef, TIJl is the log of the trend,
PRCl is the log of the price ratio, and MIJCL is the log of the lagged values of beef
imports.

Table 3. Observed and Forecasted Values for the Log ofBeeflmports, 1966-1994

Source

Destination

Country

Country

U.S
Canada
U .S
Mexico
Canada
Mexico

Canada
U.S
Mexico

us

Mexico
Canada

Observed
Value

2.51
2.36
-2.94
.12
-4.12
-1.72

Forecasted
Value

2.47
2.46
-2.97
.25
-4.41
-1.74

95%
Confidence
Interval

-1.75 .. 6.69
1.99 ..2.93
-3.03 .. -2.90
-.47 ... 97
-4.78 .. -4.04
-1.72 .. -1.74

Conclusion

No difference

No difference
No difference
No difference

No difference
No difference
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The problem is to decide whether the demand function has changed since the
time of the previous imports of beef. Since NAFTA's implementation, we can look at
the observed and predicted values for Canadian beef imports from the U.S . In 1994, the
following were the observed values:
MIJC1 1994 =2.509

TIJ1 1994 =3 .367

PRC1 1994=-3 .301

MIJCLl = 2.501

The predicted value for MIJCI is 2.474. This is also the forecast value ofMIJCl. The
estimated variance of the forecast error is
s2F= 4.22
s = 2.05 .
The 95% confidence interval for MIC1 1994 can be constructed by noting that the
tabulated value

of~ 5 •. 025

is 2.060. Therefore,

2.474 -(2.06 *2.05) < MIJC 11994 < 2.474 +(2.06*2.05)
-1.749 < MIJCI 1994 < 6.697.

(31)

This interval covers the observed value MIJC 11994 = 2. 51 .
The estimated regression equation for Mexican beef imports from the U .S. is
MIJMl; = -4.65 +. 54 TIJl;- .75PRM1; + .24MIJMLI;,

(32)

where MIJM1 is the log ofMexican beef imports from the U.S. , TIJl is the log of the
trend, PRMl is the log of the price ratio, and MIJMLl is the log of the lagged values of
beef imports. In 1994, the following were the observed values:
MIJM1 1994 = -2.94
PRM1 1994 = -.81

TIJ1 1994 = 3.36
MIJML1 = -2.96
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The predicted or forecast value for MIJMI is -2.97. The variance of the forecast error is
s2F= .001
s = .032.
The 95% confidence interval for MIJM1 1994 is
-2.97- (2.06

* .032) < MIJM1 1994 < -2.97 + (2.06 * .032)
-3 .03 < MIJM 1994 < -2.903 .

The interval covers the observed value MIJM1 1994

=

(33)

-2.937.

The estimated regression equation for U.S . beef imports from Canada is
USIC!i = 1.32 + .293TIJ!i- .47PRUSCli- .35USICLli,

(34)

where USICI is the log of the quantity ofU.S. beef imports from Canada, TIJI is the log
of the trend, PRUSC 1 is the log of the price ratio, and USICLl is the log of the lagged
values of beef imports. The following were the observed values in 1994:
USIC1 1994
PRUSC1 1994

= 2.36 TIJ1 1994 = 3.36
= -4.92 USICLl = 2.36

The predicted value for USICI is 2.46. The variance of the forecast error is
s2F = .052
SF =

.229.

The 95% confidence interval for USICl is
2.46 - (2 .06

* .229) < USIC1 1993 < 2.46 + (2.06 * .229)
1.99 < USIC1 1994 < 2.93 .

The interval covers the observed value USIC I = 2.36.

(35)

42
The estimated regression equation for U.S. beef imports from Mexico was
USIMli = -16.16 + 1.23TIJli- 2.47PRUSMli + .45USIMLli,

(36)

where USIMl is the log of the quantity of U.S . beef imports from Mexico, TIJl is the
log of the trend, PRUSMl is the log of the price ratio, and USIMLl is the log of the
lagged values of the beef imports. The following are the observed values for 1994:
USIM1 1994 = .12 TIJ1 1994 = 3.36
PRUSM1 1994 = -4.970 USIMLl = .11.
The predicted value for USIMl is .25 . The variance of the forecast error is
s2F = .052
SF = .229.
The 95% confidence interval for USIMl is
.250- (2.06

* .351) < USIM1 1994 < .250 + (2.06 * .35 1)
-.473 < USIM1 1994 < .97.

(37)

This interval covers the observed value USIM1 1994 = .12.
The estimated regression equation for Canadian beef imports from Mexico was
CAME!i = -2.95 + .09TIJli - .35PRCli- 2 97CAMELli,

(38)

where CAMEl is the log of the quantity of Canadian beef imports from Mexico, TIJI is
the log of the trend, PRCl is the log of the price ratios, and CAMEL! is the log of the
lagged values of beef imports. The following are the observed values for 1994:
CAME1 1994 = -1.72 TIJ1 1993 = 3.36
PRC1 1994 = -5 .55 CAMEL!= -1.62.
The predicted value for CAMEl is -1.736. The variance of the forecast error is
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s2F = .0047
SF=

.069.

The 95% confidence interval for CAMEl is
-1.74- (2.06*.069) < CAMEI 1994 < -1.74 + (2.06 * .069)
-1.88 < CAME1 1994 < -1.57.

(39)

The interval covers the observed value CAME 11994 = -I .72.
The estimated regression equation for Mexican beef imports from Canada was
:MECAli = -2.21 + .59TIJli -. 34PRM1i + .15:MECALli ,

(40)

where MECAI is the log of the quantity ofMexican beef imports from Canada, TIJl is
the log of the trend, PRMl is the log of the price ratios, and MECALI is the log of the
lagged values of beef imports. The following were the observed values for 1994:
MECAI 1994 = -4.11 TIJ1 1994 = 3.32
PRM1 1994 = -4.62 MECAL1 = -4.02.
The predicted value for MECA1 is -4.41. The variance of the forecast error is

s2 F= .03
SF =

.18

The 95% interval for :MECA1 is
-4.41- (2.06 • .18) < :MECA1 1993 < -4.41 +(2.06 • .18)
-4.78 < :MECA1 1994 < -4.04.
This interval covers the observed value MECA1 1994

=

-4.11. The conclusion from these

results is that the import demand functions for the three nations have not significantly
changed since the implication ofNAFT A.

(41)
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In this study, two sets of regressions were made to determine pre- and
post-NAFTA elasticities of import prices and past imports. The null hypothesis that was
tested is that the estimated parameters are the same for the two sets against the
alternative hypothesis that the estimated parameters are different. In this study, the
SSER includes the residuals of the post-NAFTA regressions. There are 28 original
observations and four parameters including the intercept in the regression. For this
particular predictive Chow test, the critical value for F(l.24 l at significance level of .05 is
4.24. The calculated values for this F-statistic using the test for all of the six regression
equations were less than the significant value. The null hypothesis, that the parameters
of the pre-NAFTA elasticities are the same as the post-NAFTA parameters, is accepted
in all of the six equation estimates. The conclusion is that there is no significant initial
change in the elasticities of price imports and market share after the implementation of
NAFTA.

Long-Run Elasticities and Net Welfare Gains
Since the implementation ofNAFTA, there has been considerable debate on the
impact of exports, imports, and job creation. As a result of trade liberalization, tariffs
between Canada, Mexico, and the United States will be phased out, and there will be
greater accessibility to the markets among the three countries. There will be both
exports and imports. When tariffs are removed, it is important to see the net national
gain of removing the tariffs in a particular sector. Table 4 summarizes the net national
gains from the removal of trade barriers on beef among the three countries.
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Table 4. Long-Term Elasticities and Net National Gains from Trade
Liberalization

Source
Country

Destination
Country

U.S.
U.S.
Canada

Canada
Mexico
U. S

Mexico

us

Canada

Mexico

Mexico

Canada

Long-Run
Import
Demand
Elasticities

Change in
Quantity
Imported
(mil of lbs.)

-2.06
-3. 12
-1.34
-5.47
-2.27
- 1. 2 1

.037
.053
.297
.157
.005
.006

Change
aso/oof
CWTent

Imports

.003
.900
.028
. 137
.277
.333

Doll ar
Value of Net
Welfare
Gains
(mil of U.S.$)

.0 10
.O il
.022
.840
.001
.020

In this study, the focus is the impact of the liberalization of the beef trade .
According to the US Department of Commerce (1994), the effective rate of tariff on
beef imports for the U.S was 5%. According to the Canadian Ministry of Finance, the
effective tariff rate on Canadian beef imports was 2%. According to the Mexican
Department of Commerce, the effective tariff rate on Mexican beef imports was 5%.
With respect to Canadian beef imports from the US., the estimated import
elasticity of demand was relatively inelastic at -.64. With the removal of the tariff, the
change in the quantity of beef imported would increase by .037 million pounds. The net
national welfare gain to the Canadian economy as a result of removing the tariff on beef
imports from the U.S was calculated to be $.002 million . The calculation of the national
gain is shown in the appendix.
With respect to Mexican beef imports rrom the US , the import elasticity of
demand was estimated to be relatively inelastic at -.75 . With the removal of the tariff,
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the change in the quantity of beef imported would increase by .053 million pounds. The
net national gain to the Mexican economy as a result of removing the tariff on beef
imports from the U.S. was calculated to be $.078 million.
With respect to U.S. beef imports from Canada, the import elasticity of demand
was estimated to be relatively inelastic at -.4 7. With the removal of the tariff, the change
in the quantity ofbeefimports would decrease by .297 million pounds. The net national
gain to the U.S . economy as a result of removing the tariff was calculated to be $.006
million.
With respect to U.S . beef imports from Mexico, the import elasticity of demand
was estimated to be relatively elastic at -2.46. With the removal of the tariff, the change
in the quantity of beef imports frm Mexico would increase by .157 million pounds. The
net national gain to the U .S. economy was calculated to be $.003 million.
With respect to Canadian beef imports from Mexico, the import elasticity of
demand was calculated to be relatively inelastic at -.35 . With the removal of the tariff,
the change in the quantity ofbeefimports from Mexico would increase by .006 million
pounds. The net national gain to the Canadian economy was calculated to be
$001million.
With respect to Mexican beef imports from Canada, the import elasticity of
demand was calculated to be relatively inelastic at -.34. With the removal of the tariff,
the net change in the quantity of beef imports would be .005 million pounds. The net
national gain to the Mexican economy was calculated to be $.001 million.
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The long-run elasticity of import demand was also estimated for the three
countries. For Canadian beef imports from the U.S ., it was estimated to be relatively
elastic at -2.06. For Mexican beef imports from the U.S., the elasticity of demand was
estimated to be relatively elastic at -3 . 12. For U.S. beef imports from Canada, the
long-run elasticity of demand was relatively elastic at -1.34. For U.S. beef imports from
Mexico, the long-run elasticity of demand was relatively elastic at -5.47. For Canadian
beef imports from Mexico, the long-run elasticity was relatively elastic at -1.21. For
Mexican beef imports from Canada, the long-run elasticity was relatively elastic at -2.27.
The results of the estimation of the long-run elasticity of demand for beef imports
were consistent with economic theory. In the long run, demand tends to be more elastic
because of the ease of substitutability of competing products in the market.
With respect to net national gain, the gains to the consumers were greater in the
long run after the removal of trade barriers. For U.S . beef imports from Mexico, the
long-run gain to the U.S . economy was calculated to be $.84 million. This was the most
significant gain among the three countries in the long run . For U.S. beef imports from
Canada, the long-run net national gain was calculated to be $.22 million.
In the long run, the net national gain for Canadian beef imports from the U.S.
was calculated to be $.010 million. For Mexican beef imports from the U.S ., the result
was similar with the net national gain being $.011 million.
With respect to the Canadian/Mexican beef trade, the net national gain to the
Canadian economy was the most significant. It was calculated to be $.020 million. For
Mexican beef imports from Canada, the long-run gain was $.001 million.
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Summary and Conclusions
The results of this study show that, in the short run or the years immediately
following the implementation ofNAFT A, there will not be significant changes to the beef
trade among the three countries. The long-run implication of the implementation of
NAFTA shows that Mexican beef exports to the U.S . and, hence, U.S . beef imports
from Mexico, will gain the most, as reflected in the estimation of the elasticities and the
calculation of net national gains. With the removal of trade barrires on beef imports, all
three nations will have positive gains to their respective economies.
The results of the analysis appear to conform with economic theory. In the long
run, the elasticities are more elastic than in the short run. This is because, after the trade
barriers have been lifted, agents can more easily adjust to price changes over time. There
is more ease of substitutability in the long run than in the short run. In the short run, the
import elasticities of the three importers, U.S ., Canada, and Mexico, are relatively
inelastic. The exception is U.S . beef imports from Mexico, which are relatively elastic in
both the short and long runs. A possible explanation for this might be that American
importers of Mexican beef can easily substitute other beef or meat products both in the
short and long runs. Because Mexico is considered a lesser developed country (LDC),
its beef products might not be ofthe same quality as those of more developed nations.
From this study, it is also interesting to see that Mexico will be the largest winner
in terms of export gains, followed by the U.S . and then Canada. Among the three
trading partners, Mexico is the LDC. A common characteristic among LDCs is that the
income elasticity of demand for food items such as beef is higher since food amounts to a
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greater share in the household budgets of the agents of these countries. With the
removal of trade barriers on beef, it is apparent that the export gains will mean more
gains for the Mexican economy in the long run .
There may be various reasons why Canada may gain the least. The geograph ical
location of Canada as compared to Mexico might give it a disadvantage with respect to
the accessibility to the American market for beef The beef quality of Canada might not
be the type that is demanded by American beef importers. The U.S . probably has the
highest quaity of beef products. With the quality ofbeefcomes the variety of beef
products. Canada may not be producing the variety that is demanded by U.S. beef
importers.
What is not evident from this study is the impact ofNAFT A on other products
that could be substituted for beef The focus of this study was the impact ofNAFTA on
the U.S. beef trade with Canada and Mexico. The time frame for the adjustments to take
place after the removal of trade barriers on beef is not known either.

Policy Implications
The policy implications for the United States from this study are that it is in the
best economic interest to remove the trade barriers on beef with our neighbors- Canada
and Mexico. From both a theoretical and practical perspective, the removal of barriers
on beef benefits the American consumers in terms of net welfare gains in the long run .
What is not directly observable is the time frame for the adjustments to occur as a result
of the removal of trade barriers.
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( 1)

Import demand elasticity
D.M

i

d

=

M
---;;p

or

D.M · I ( 4 p)
M

i

p

Or

p

where M = quantity of imports, tiM = change in the quantity of imports,
P = price of imports, and tiP = change in the price of imports.

(2)

Net national welfare gain= NG = Y, (t) (tiM)
where t = tariff in dollars per pound, and tiM = change in the quantity of
imports.
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Table 5. U.S. Beef Exports to Canada (1966-1993)

Year

Quantity
(millions of lbs.)

Avg. Price per Lb.
(U.S.$)

1966
1967
1968
1969
1970
1971
1972
1973
1974
1975
1976
1977
1978
1979
1980
1981
1982
1983
1984
1985
1986
1987
1988
1989
1990
199 1
1992
1993

2.90
2.00
0.8 1
2.70
2.50
2.60
3.20
2.40
1.80
1.60
4.90
2.00
2.33
2.57
6.78
10.52
11.00
12.00
10.80
11.60
12.40
12.00
10.90
11.20
11.70
11.90
12.10
12.20

1.45
3.00
4.44
1.52
2.00
5.27
6.28
9.38
9.67
8.25
5.35
7. 20
6.99
4.90
2.73
1.83
2.39
2.67
2.53
2.86
3.25
3.03
3.59
4.22
4.22
4.24
4.23
4.22

Source: U.S. Department of Commerce ( 1994).
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Table 6. U.S. Beef Imports from Canada (1966-1993)

Year

Quantity
(millions oflbs.)

1966
1967
1968
1969
1970
1971
1972
1973
1974
1975
1976
1977
1978
1979
1980
198 1
1982
1983
1984
1985
1986
1987
1988
1989
1990
1991
1992
1993

13.40
4.86
12.70
5.00
13.70
12.50
11.60
10.40
9. 10
9.20
8.70
8.50
7.90
8.20
8.50
9.30
9. 10
8.70
9.20
10.00
10.40
10.20
10.70
11. 10
10.50
10.55
10.57
10.50

Source: U.S. Department of Commerce (1994).

Avg. Price per Lb.
(U.S$)

.32
.3 1
.35
.40
.42
.51
.59
.64
.69
.63
.62
.57
.68
1.02
1. 12
1.09
1.0 1
1.1 2
1. 14
1.06
.98
1.08
.90
.84
.82
.83
.82
.83
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Table 7. U.S. Beef Exports to Mexico (1966-1993)

Year

I966
I967
I968
I969
I970
I97I
I972
I 973
I974
I975
I976
I977
I978
I 979
I980
I98 I
I982
1983
I984
I985
I986
I987
I988
I989
I990
I99 I
I992
I993

Quantity
(millions of Ibs.)

.O I8
.02I
.020
.034
.033
.OI7
.OI8
.OI6
.022
.OI8
.037
.046
.052
.026
.034
.030
.025
.027
.036
.037
.034
.042
.04I
.043
.044
.046
.050
.052

Source: U.S. Department of Commerce ( I 994 ).

Avg. Price per Lb.
(U .S$)

8.390
7.000
I4. I50
8.030
9.090
30.000
33 .890
34 .8IO
29.540
42.870
27.300
26.300
30.000
68.460
54.7 IO
60.670
66.000
65. 190
44.720
42.700
53.530
65.000
64.390
63 .950
63 .860
65.2IO
6 1.000
59.040
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Table 8. U.S. Beeflmports from Mexico (1966-1993)

Year

1966
1967
1968
1969
1970
1971
1972
1973
1974
1975
1976
1977
1978
1979
1980
198 1
1982
1983
1984
1985
1986
1987
1988
1989
1990
1991
1992
1993

Quantity
(millions of lbs.)

.484
.152
. 172
.084
.045
.670
.700
.760
.800
.820
.870
1.000
1.210
1.6 10
1.000
1.220
1. 220
1.230
1250
1.270
1.310
1.160
1. 160
1.1 so
1. 120
1. 120
1. 110
1.130

Source: U.S. Department of Commerce (1994).

Avg. Price per Lb.
(U.S.$)

.337
.368
.360
.369
.511
.283
.385
.421
.463
.500
.482
.470
.463
.378
.585
.650
.6 10
.552
.624
.637
.6 11
.793
.784
.756
.794
.794
.796
.789
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Table 9. Canadian Beeflmports from Mexico (1966-1993)

Year

1966
1967
1968
1969
1970
1971
1972
1973
1974
1975
1976
1977
1978
1979
1980
198 1
1982
1983
1984
1985
1986
1987
1988
1989
1990
1991
1992
1993

Quantity
(millions of lbs.)

.281
.267
.278
.250
.267
.275
.281
.279
.300
.288
.270
.290
.305
.310
.320
.310
.320
.330
.322
.328
.332
.335
.340
.360
.361
.358
.360
.361

Avg. Price per Lb.
(U.S.$)

.320
.344
.317
.380
.374
.440
.445
.444
.440
.444
.481
.455
.442
.445
.440
.451
.453
.454
.448
.454
.470
.472
.468
.444
.449
.444
.447
.448

Sources: Canadian Ministry of Finance ( 1994), and Mexican Dept. of Commerce (1994 ).
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Table 10. Mexican Beeflmports from Canada (1966-1993)

Year

1966
1967
1968
1969
1970
1971
1972
1973
1974
1975
1976
1977
1978
1979
1980
198 1
1982
1983
1984
1985
1986
1987
1988
1989
1990
1991
1992
1993

Quantity
(millions oflbs.)

.00 1
.002
.002
.002
.002
.002
.002
.003
.003
.004
.005
.006
.009
.011
.013
.012
.0 11
.012
.014
.013
.015
.0 14
.0 16
.0 18
.0 19
.017
.018
.018

Avg. Price per Lb.
(U.S.$)

1.062
1.267
1.000
1.111
1.050
1.200
1.140
1.140
1.250
1.250
1.400
1.330
1.330
1.360
1.230
1.420
1. 550
1.330
1.210
1.310
1.270
1.430
1.250
1.1 70
1.210
1.290
1.280
1.280

Sources: Canadian Ministry ofFinance ( 1994), and Mexican Dept. of Commerce (1994).
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Table II. Beef Price Indices in Canada, Mexico, and U.S.
(1966-1993)

Year

1966
1967
1968
1969
1970
197 1
1972
1973
1974
1975
1976
1977
1978
1979
1980
198 1
1982
1983
1984
1985
1986
1987
1988
1989
1990
199 1
1992
1993

Canadian lndex

80.55
82.27
84.35
86.50
87.60
89.44
90.65
91.25
92.62
95.35
99.23
100.93
98.9 1
97.44
100.7 5
102.09
105.7 1
104.25
106.43
108.12
106.87
106.60
112.08
110.71
112.59
113.20
113.50
11 4. 10

Mexican Index

40.28
44.3 1
47 .25
51.15
56.29
60.37
64 .55
68.73
72.91
76.69
81.40
87.99
95.83
96.79
99.23
105.53
100.87
11 4.56
112.41
11 2.23
11 6.62
113.26
124.97
129.4 1
129.45
129.48
129.80
130.20

Source: U.S. Department of Commerce ( 1994).

U.S. Index

82.08
85.60
89.67
91.55
92.65
90.72
94.65
96.76
95.65
95. 14
100.98
101.06
99.27
97.55
100.27
102.21
10 1.46
104.7 1
104.29
106.75
108.36
107.92
11 0. 11
109.64
109.96
110.20
111.10
113.30

